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Martha Chamallas**
This Essay discusses a very different kind of tort reform that is
occurring largely under the radar screen. It is not the familiar kind
of tort reform that imposes a limitation on liability or damages
through a specific piece of legislation or a major court decision.
Instead, it takes the form of a gradual change that subtly channels
cases into state or federal courts and shapes whether litigators
frame their clients' cases as violations of state or federal law.
At the outset, I should tell you that I teach in two areas: torts
and civil rights law, principally Title VII law. For quite some time, I
have been plagued by the fact that I cannot formulate a simple
answer to a seemingly simple question: when does discriminatory
behavior amount to a tort?
In fact, the connection between tort law-the premier system
designed to protect against civil wrongs-and civil rights is an
under-theorized topic that surfaces only sporadically-for example,
in the debate over hate speech.' Non-lawyers may be surprised to
learn that proven discrimination on the basis of race and sex does
not always amount to a tort and that even persistent racial or sexual
harassment may not be enough for tort recovery. Law students, on
the other hand, often presume incorrectly that the domains of torts
and civil rights are mutually exclusive, in line with the discrete
categories assigned to those subjects in the law school curriculum.
So I have set for myself the following project: to map and
analyze the degree of overlap between torts and civil rights. I think
of the project as investigating the degree to which civil rights
principles have migrated into tort law.2 This Essay addresses one
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1. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial
Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 181 (1982);
Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 478.
2. For a related discussion of the connection between torts and civil rights
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piece of that migration project, focusing on my favorite tort-
intentional infliction of mental distress-and claims of sex or race
harassment in the workplace. This is the intersection of torts and
civil rights, the place where outrage and discrimination meet.
The story starts in the 1970s, when plaintiffs' attorneys wanted
to bring their discrimination claims in federal courts under federal
law, where presumably the judges were better trained in civil rights
principles and the juries were more cosmopolitan. As you are well
aware, however, things have changed dramatically. Today, many
plaintiffs' attorneys prefer state forums and, perhaps more
importantly, plaintiffs very much want to assert and retain state
law claims. It is now employers who often seek out federal forums
and wish to eliminate state claims for harassment and
discrimination.
In cases of workplace harassment, there are typically at least
three potential claims: a Title VII claim for discrimination, a state
statutory civil rights claim, and a tort claim for intentional infliction
of mental distress. From a practical perspective, the advantage of a
tort claim to plaintiffs is that it offers the prospect of uncapped
compensatory and punitive damages. Particularly in cases in which
the plaintiff has not been terminated from her job-and thus cannot
assert a constructive discharge claim'-recovery for non-economic
damages is critical. Since the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
Title VII has allowed compensatory and punitive damages, but the
caps on such damages under Title VII are low: the total cap on
combined compensatory and punitive damages is set between
$50,000 and $300,000, depending on the size of the employer.4 In
contrast, many states impose caps on compensatory damages only in
medical malpractice actions,5 and the greater number of states that
have caps on punitive damages are generally more liberal than the
Title VII caps. 6
in the context of damages for economic loss, see Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights
in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the Calculation of Economic Loss, 38
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1435 (2005).
3. Under the general law of constructive discharge, a plaintiff may recover
for economic loss, including backpay and frontpay, that stems from loss of the
job. See Martha Chamallas, Title VII's Midlife Crises: The Case of Constructive
Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 315 (2004). To establish constructive
discharge, however, the plaintiff must generally prove that the employer had
rendered the employee's working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable
person would have quit her job. Id. at 316.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000).
5. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical
Malpractice Damage Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391 app. 1 (2005).
6. Catherine M. Sharkey, Dissecting Damages: An Empirical Exploration
of Sexual Harassment Awards, 3 J. EMPIRcAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 42 (2006).
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Indeed, a recent empirical study of sexual harassment cases,
conducted by Professor Catherine Sharkey of Columbia Law School,
found that the inclusion of state law claims for harassment had the
effect of increasing awards for sexual harassment plaintiffs.7
Sharkey calculated the median award in harassment cases that
included a tort claim ($221,263) compared to those without a tort
claim ($150,250). 8  After controlling for myriad independent
variables that might affect the level of damages (such as whether
there was physical contact, evidence of a pattern involving other
employees, etc.), she found that including a tort claim increased an
award on average by $137,176 in total damages and by $136,021 in
what she called outrage damages, i.e., the combination of
compensatory and punitive damages.9  Her study shows why
plaintiffs might want to hang onto their tort claims and why
defendants might like to keep civil rights principles from migrating
into tort law.10
Aside from the possibilities of upping a damage award, tort law
is attractive to some claimants because of its universal character
and its looser formulation of required elements. The influential
section 46 of the Second Restatement of Torts required only four
elements to prove a claim of intentional infliction: (1) intent or
recklessness; (2) extreme and outrageous conduct; (3) causation; and
(4) severe mental distress." The latest version of the new
Restatement reiterates these four elements and reaffirms that a
finding of "outrageousness" is the centerpiece of the intentional
infliction claim and does the "most important normative work" in
screening cases.12  In making this threshold determination of
outrageousness on a case-by-case basis, courts often consider a
variety of factors, including whether the defendant has abused a
position of power, the special vulnerability of the plaintiff, and the
repeated nature of the defendant's conduct in situations the plaintiff
cannot easily avoid. 13  Although it is impossible to capture the
breadth of the malleable notion of outrage in tort, Dan Dobbs, in his
7. Sharkey's data set consisted of 232 cases in which plaintiffs won
compensatory damages from trial and appellate decisions in both federal and
state courts from 1982-2004, published either in official reporters or on
Westlaw. Id. at 3.
8. Id. at 38-39.
9. Id. at 39.
10. Id. at 44.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 45 cmt.
c, p.10 (Preliminary Draft 2005).
13. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 304, at 827 (2000) (discussing
markers of outrageous conduct).
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influential treatise, sums up the caselaw by noting that "[i]n none of
these instances are the parties in a position of equality; in each of
these instances the defendant uses the inequality to inflict
emotional harm without regard for the plaintiffs interests."
14
In contrast, as Title VII has matured, it has become
increasingly complex and rigid. Compared to the universal
principles of tort law, Title VII is a status-based or identity-based
law, protecting only against discrimination based on certain
specified bases. 5 Thus, there are perennial struggles over what
constitutes "sex-based" discrimination or what qualifies as
discrimination based on race or national origin. Because equally
harmful and related forms of discrimination, such as discrimination
based on sexual orientation or language are not covered by Title VII,
litigators often attempt to shoehorn their claims into one of the
protected categories. Additionally, many contemporary forms of bias
fall through the cracks of the Title VII categories. There is little
space, for example, for same-sex harassment,16 multi-dimensional
discrimination," such as race and class inflected claims, or
discrimination against sub-groups.'8 Title VII's focus on the group
status of the victim, moreover, makes it difficult to reach bias
directed at persons because of how they perform their identity 9 (e.g.,
14. Id.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) (listing race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin as bases for protection).
16. Although the Supreme Court opened the door for same-sex harassment
claims in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998),
there is still great uncertainty as to how plaintiffs in such cases can establish
that their harassment was based on sex. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, When Is
Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 1697, 1793 (2002).
17. Courts often have difficulty dealing with "intersectional" claims where
it is impossible to separate the different strands of discrimination, e.g., where
an individual experiences distinctive discrimination as a low-income woman of
color. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1467, 1472 (1992). Cf Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker
Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 58 (1988) (discussing multi-dimensional discrimination against
workers).
18. Early on, the Supreme Court acknowledged that discrimination against
subgroups of a protected class is actionable under Title VII. See Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (rejecting the sex-plus
doctrine). However, it is still difficult for plaintiffs to prove discrimination when
other members of the protected class are not targeted. See Martha Chamallas,
Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and
Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95, 132 (1992) (discussing
employers' use of testimony by non-targeted members of the protected class).
19. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L.
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the effeminate man)20 or against persons who refuse to cover their
identity and resist assimilation21 (e.g., the African American woman
who wears corn rows). 22  Although scholars have called for
expanding the meaning of race and sex discrimination to reach such
complex claims and complex claimants,23 for the most part, the
federal courts are not buying these arguments.24
It is not surprising then that there has been a turn to tort law,
where plaintiffs are not required to pinpoint the motivation behind
their harassment or mistreatment in order to recover. The
availability of tort law could prove particularly important, for
example, in a case of same-sex harassment in which one of the forms
of abuse consists of forbidding the plaintiff from speaking Spanish in
the presence of the harasser.25 To prevail on a claim for intentional
infliction of mental distress, the plaintiff in such a case would be
spared from having to establish that the harassment was based on
sex or national origin-and thus actionable under Title VII-rather
than being based on sexual orientation or language-and thus not
covered by the federal law. Instead, the main focus in the tort
action would simply be whether the defendant's conduct was
outrageous.
Let me pose a descriptive and a normative question about this
topic. First, to what extent have courts allowed plaintiffs with
workplace harassment claims to bring claims for intentional
infliction of mental distress? Second, how much overlap should
there be between torts and civil rights law, or put another way,
should migration be encouraged or discouraged? Because of the
constraints of space, I will be long on description and make only a
few brief comments about the difficult policy question.
The short answer to the descriptive question is that there is
currently considerable variation among the states. There are
basically two approaches: the majority of courts treat the claim of
REV. 1259, 1298 (2000).
20. Mary Ann C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105
YALE L.J. 1, 33 (1995).
21. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 837 (2002).
22. See Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection
of Race and Gender, 1991 DuKE L.J. 365.
23. See Kathryn Abrams, Complex Claimants and Reductive Moral
Judgments: New Patterns in the Search for Equality, 57 U. PIrrr. L. REV. 337,
361 (1996); Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92
MICH. L. REV. 2479, 2540 (1994).
24. Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986).
25. See Lucerno-Nelson v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 1 F. Supp. 2d
1, 4 (D.D.C. 1998) (examining same-sex harassment mixed with language
discrimination).
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intentional infliction of mental distress as a mere "gap filler" that
comes into play only when no other remedy is available; 26 a minority
of courts treat it as an independent cause of action that provides
mutual reinforcement for civil rights and other important public
policies.27
Let me explain how this "gap filler" versus "reinforcement of
civil rights" debate plays out in the cases. At first blush it might
seem that the intentional infliction tort would be well-suited to
capture harassment and other discriminatory harms. It dispenses
with the need to prove physical harm or fear of physical harm, and it
goes beyond cases of malice and ill will under the broad "intent"
standard in tort law. 2  Equally as important, the intentional
infliction tort seems tailor-made to respond to an abusive course of
conduct over a period of time, rather than simply to a discrete act.
In this sense, it is a tort uniquely capable of comprehending the kind
of pervasive and repeated harassment that characterizes a hostile
workplace environment.
Despite these features, however, in most jurisdictions proof of
discriminatory workplace harassment-the kind of discrimination
that looks most like a tort-is not sufficient to guarantee tort
recovery. For the most part, courts do not equate discrimination
with outrageous conduct. 9  With the notable exception of
California, ° courts have refused to classify discrimination as per se
outrageous conduct and have even hesitated to declare the "severe
26. See infra note 33.
27. See infra note 61.
28. To establish intent, a tort plaintiff need only prove that the tortfeasor
acted either with the purpose of producing the consequence or with knowledge
that the consequence was substantially certain to result. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 1 (Proposed Final Draft 2005).
Additionally, courts have allowed intentional infliction claims to proceed when
the defendant's state of mind was merely reckless. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYsICAL HARM § 45 cmt. f (Preliminary Draft 2005).
29. See infra note 33.
30. Intermediate appellate courts in California have taken the position that
harassment that violates the state's antidiscrimination laws is per se
outrageous and gives rise to a tort action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. See Toran v. Jones, No. H025568, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4887,
at *15-16 (Ct. App. May 19, 2003) (finding discrimination based on disability
and denial of medical leave is per se outrageous); Kovatch v. Cal. Casualty
Mgmt. Co., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 217, 230-31 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
harassment based on sexual orientation is per se outrageous); Fisher v. San
Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 842, 858 (Ct. App. 1989) ("Given an
employee's fundamental, civil right to a discrimination free work
environment.., by its very nature, sexual harassment in the work place is
outrageous conduct as it exceeds all bounds of decency usually tolerated by a
decent society.").
702 [Vol. 41
CIVIL RIGHTS TORT CLAIMS
or pervasive" harassment required to prove a Title VII claim of
hostile environment 3' as sufficient to meet the threshold tort
requirement of "extreme and outrageous" conduct. The bar of
outrageousness is occasionally set so high that even the plaintiff
who succeeds in proving a constructive discharge, with evidence that
working conditions were so "intolerable" that a reasonable person
would have quit the job, may not be confident of recovery in tort.32
A fairly typical case is Pucci v. USAIR, 33 a sexual harassment
case decided by a federal district court in Florida after removal from
state court on diversity grounds. Valerie Pucci was the only woman
employed on her shift at the airline's maintenance department in
Orlando. 34  At an initial meeting with her supervisor, Pucci was
warned that she would be exposed to profanity because "USAIR's
employees did not know how to act around female coworkers., 35 For
approximately ten months, she was subjected to a persistent
campaign of harassment by her male co-workers.36 Much of the
harassment consisted of repeatedly placing pornographic pictures on
and inside her desk in her absence, even though her work area was
just outside the supervisor's office.3" The court's opinion recites five
such incidents.38 After each incident, plaintiff complained to a
supervisor, but nothing was ever done to discover or punish those
31. In hostile environment cases, harassment plaintiffs generally must
prove that the conduct complained of was (1) unwelcome, (2) severe or
pervasive, and (3) based on sex or some other prohibited basis, while also
demonstrating a basis for imposing employer responsibility for the acts of
supervisors or co-workers. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 747-
54 (1998).
32. See Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir. 1991)
(indicating in dicta that constructive discharge should be regarded as
"outrageous" conduct only in "the most unusual cases").
33. 940 F. Supp. 305 (M.D. Fla. 1996). Courts in Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Kansas, Maryland, and Michigan also apply a very
strict standard which bars most intentional infliction claims in the employment
context. See Hartleip v. McNeilab, Inc., 83 F.3d 767, 777 (6th Cir. 1996)
(applying Michigan law); Greenwood v. Delphi Auto. Sys., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d
1047, 1073-74 (S.D. Ohio 2003); Arabi v. Fred Meyers, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 462,
466 (D. Md. 2002); Holloman v. Keadle, 931 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Ark. 1996); Aaron
v. Werne, No. 65,060, 1991 Kan. LEXIS 57, at *9-11 (Kan. Mar. 1, 1991); Miner
v. Mid-Am. Door Co., 68 P.3d 212, 223 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002); Hoy v. Angelone,
720 A.2d 745, 754 (Pa. 1998); Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144
S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004).
34. Pucci, 940 F. Supp. at 307.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 307-08.
37. Id. at 307.
38. Id. at 307-08.
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responsible. Instead, Pucci was told by USAIR's manager that she
was to blame and that she had been told to expect "industrial
language" when working with a group of men.40  At times, the
harassment took a more personal turn: for example, Pucci found
obscene notes tacked onto the attendance board referring
specifically to her and her anatomy.4
To cut down on the barrage of pornography, she was moved into
a secured office, which was kept locked when not in use and which
Pucci described as a "cage and not an office."' 2 Her stress reached a
point where she finally sought medical treatment for anxiety and
depression and was admitted to the hospital on an outpatient
basis.43 Pucci even feared that her co-workers would attack or stalk
her and claimed that her fear caused her to fall down the stairs one
day when leaving work.44 Ultimately, her request to transfer out of
Orlando was granted, a move she claimed was disruptive for her
marriage and children.45
In many respects, Pucci is a classic case of hostile environment
sexual harassment. There was no dispute that she was targeted for
harassment because she was the only woman working on her male-
dominated shift.46 Her harassment was persistent, sexualized, and
calculated to make her feel ostracized and humiliated.47 When she
complained to management, the problem was not corrected, but in
fact was made worse by the belief that harassment was something
that she should endure as part of the job.48 Lastly, the harassment
caused her a variety of damages, including medical bills, mental
49distress, and employment-related expenses.
It is telling that Pucci's complaint of intentional infliction of
mental distress did not even survive a motion to dismiss.50 For the
Florida trial court, the distinction between discriminatory
harassment and outrageous conduct was so great that it had little
39. Id.
40. Id. at 308.
41. Pucci found a note on the attendance board stating that a co-worker
was "Sick-Due to lack of blow jobs from Valerie" and a homemade card placed
on her desk stating, "Val's Weight Soars to 200 Lbs." She recounted that she
overhead one employee telling another that he had been sent in to see her and
joked, "What are we suppose to do? Stick her then lick her?" Id. at 307-08.
42. Id. at 307.
43. Id. at 308.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 307.
47. Id. at 307-08.
48. Id. at 308.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 309.
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difficulty reciting the boilerplate limitations on recovery for
intentional infliction and moving on to the next issue in the case.51
The court simply concluded that, although the conduct directed at
Pucci was "not civilized behavior," her harassment was not "so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency"
and presumably fell into the nonactionable realm of "mere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other
trivialities."5 2
It should be pointed out that the court never reached the issue
of vicarious liability of USAIR for the acts of the harassers in this
case. 53  Instead, by knocking out the case for failure to prove
outrageous conduct, the court implied that even if Pucci had known
the identity of her harassers and had sued them individually, she
still would have lost the case.54 As a practical matter, this point is
important when analyzing the intersection of tort and civil rights
because individual supervisors and co-workers generally may not be
sued under Title VII 55 or under many of the parallel state civil rights
acts.56 However, no such restriction exists under tort law which
prohibits suits against both individual actors and employers. Thus,
the tort claim is often the only way to pursue a claim against the
harasser individually and, if defeated for lack of proof of




53. Id. Whether an employer will likely be held vicariously liable for
harassment by a supervisor in a tort action for intentional infliction also
depends on the jurisdiction. Some courts apply a liberal standard and impose
liability where the acts complained of took place on the job and resulted from or
were an outgrowth of employment duties. See Harris v. Pameco Corp., 12 P.3d
524, 530 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). Other courts apply a restrictive standard,
refusing to impose vicarious liability if the supervisor was acting for purely
personal reasons disconnected from the employer's business. See Travis Pruitt
& Assocs. v. Hooper, 625 S.E.2d 445, 448 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). The liberal
standard focuses on the overall context of the supervisor's action, while the
restrictive standard places emphasis on the supervisor's motivation.
54. Pucci, 940 F. Supp. at 309.
55. See, e.g., Lissau v. S. Food Servs., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998)
(holding individual employees are not liable under Title VII); accord Huckabay
v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 241 (5th Cir. 1998); Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490,
1504 (11th Cir. 1995); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995);
Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993). But see Wyss v.
Gen. Dynamics Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 202, 204 (D.R.I. 1998) (holding individual
supervisors liable under Title VII and Rhode Island fair employment statute).
56. See, e.g., Reno v. Baird, 957 P.2d 1333, 1335-36 (Cal. 1998) (finding
supervisor may not be sued individually for discrimination under state fair
employment and housing act).
7052006]
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
As Pucci illustrates, for many courts, something more than
discrimination or even persistent harassment is needed to establish
outrageousness in the employment context. To date, however, most
courts have been unable to articulate precisely what constitutes that
extra element.57  For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
rejected a lower court's view that a showing of retaliation, in
addition to proof of discrimination or harassment, was a
prerequisite to establishing the outrageousness of an employer's
conduct. 58 Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was willing to
impose liability only for "the most clearly desperate and ultra
extreme conduct"59 and thus took an extremely narrow view of the
intentional infliction tort, it still clung to a holistic approach,
judging each case on its particular facts.6" Not surprisingly,
decisions in this area often lack analysis: similar to Pucci, courts
tend to recite the facts of the instant case, indicate that recovery
was denied in other cases of bad conduct, and rule that the conduct
in the instant case does not meet the demanding standard for
outrageousness.
A very different portrait of the intersection of torts and civil
rights comes from a minority of jurisdictions which allow intentional
infliction claims to proceed in cases not markedly different from the
Pucci sexual harassment case. A good example is Coates v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc.,61 a sexual harassment case decided by the
57. Some courts, while acknowledging that each claim must be decided "on
its own merits," have listed aggravating factors that have generally been
present in outrageous cases of harassment. See Guthrie v. Conroy, 152 N.C.
App. 15, 22-23, 567 S.E.2d 403, 409 (2002) (listing as indicia of outrageousness:
(1) unfair power relationship between defendant and plaintiff; (2) explicitly
obscene or "X rated" language; (3) sexual advances toward the plaintiff; (4)
statements expressing sexual desire to engage in sexual relations with plaintiff;
and (5) defendant touching plaintiffs private areas or touching any part of the
plaintiffs body with his private parts).
58. See Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 754 (Pa. 1998).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 754-55.
61. 976 P.2d 999 (N.M. 1999). Courts in Alaska, North Dakota, Tennessee,
New Jersey, Washington, Oregon, Utah, Wyoming and the District of Columbia
have also taken a more liberal approach to the intentional infliction tort in the
employment context. See Pollard v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours, Inc., 412 F.3d
657, 664-65 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying Tennessee law); Wal-Mart, Inc. v. Stewart,
990 P.2d 626, 634-36 (Alaska 1999); Underwood v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin.,
665 A.2d 621, 640 (D.C. 1995); Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 700 (N.J. 1998);
Swenson v. N. Crop Ins., Inc., 498 N.W.2d 174, 181-86 (N.D. 1993); Harris v.
Pameco Corp., 12 P.3d 524, 529 (Or. Ct. App. 2000); Retherford v. AT & T
Commc'ns of the Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 978 (Utah 1992); Robel v.
Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 621 (Wash. 2002); Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d
1337, 1345 (Wyo. 1997).
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Supreme Court of New Mexico in 1999. The harasser in that case
was a supervisor at Sam's Club who persistently targeted female
employees, including the two plaintiffs in the case, while
management stood by and did nothing.62 In addition to complaining
about the supervisor's obscene gestures and "lewd and vulgar"
suggestions, the plaintiffs in Coates also pointed to two incidents of
physical harassment in which the supervisor grabbed the breasts of
one of the plaintiffs and pulled open the blouse of another female
employee. 63 Wal-Mart managers observed some of this behavior, yet
did not reprimand or discipline the offending supervisor and, at one
point, told one of the plaintiffs that she could quit if she did not like
their decisions.64
The state trial court allowed the intentional infliction claim and
another state law claim to proceed against Wal-Mart. 6' The jury
was apparently of the view that defendant's conduct was indeed
outrageous, as evidenced by the size of the verdict for each of the
two plaintiffs, particularly the portion for punitive damages (one
plaintiff received $1.2 million, the other $555,000).66 In marked
contrast to the Florida court, the New Mexico Supreme Court
upheld the judgment, using the same Restatement framework of
liability for intentional infliction of mental distress.67 Rather than
drawing a contrast between discrimination and outrageous conduct,
however, the New Mexico Supreme Court stressed the compatibility
between civil rights and tort law, declaring that "[a] llowing a worker
subjected to sexual harassment to seek civil damages 'not only
vindicates the state's interest in enforcing public policy but also
adequately redresses the harm to the individual naturally flowing
from the violation of public policy."'6 8
There are ways, of course, to distinguish Pucci and Coates. The
supervisor in Coates committed a battery against one of the
plaintiffs and physically assaulted another women employee, while
the harassment in Pucci was solely of the nonphysical variety, i.e.,
humiliating comments and the use of pornography. Nevertheless,
the New Mexico Supreme Court in Coates also upheld the jury's
verdict in favor of one of the female employees who did not suffer
any physical harassment and stressed that all incidents should be
62. Coates, 976 P.2d at 1002.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1002-03.
65. Id. at 1003.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1009-10.
68. Id. at 1005 (quoting Michaels v. Anglo Am. Auto Auctions, Inc., 869
P.2d 279, 281 (N.M. 1994)).
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viewed "cumulatively" under the intentional infliction tort.69
Significantly, the plaintiff in Coates who was physically harassed
did not assert a claim for battery and did not otherwise emphasize
the physical aspect of her harassment." While undoubtedly each
incident in Coates, including the two incidents of physical
harassment, were important in proving the persistent and serious
nature of the harassment, it was also very important that the
harassment lasted for approximately a year and that Wal-Mart's
management was callously indifferent to plaintiffs' plights. 71 In
these last two respects, Coates and Pucci are quite similar. Finally,
it is not irrational to regard the harassment in Pucci as even more
damaging than that endured by the Wal-Mart employees in Coates:
at least the women at Wal-Mart were able to band together to resist
their harassment, while Pucci's status as the only woman on her
shift increased her isolation and arguably worsened her
predicament.
As I read the cases, the widely disparate results in Coates and
Pucci cannot be explained simply by a judgment that the
harassment in Coates was worse than that in Pucci. Instead, it
appears that the courts in the two cases used two different
approaches to the intentional infliction tort, although each
purported to adhere to the Restatement elements. The Florida court
approached the intentional infliction tort as a "gap filler," to be used
sparingly in the employment context, presumably only in
exceptional cases of harassment or discrimination that stand apart
from the typical civil rights case.72 In contrast, the New Mexico
court approached the intentional infliction tort on more equal
grounds: it viewed the claim as reinforcement of the state's public
policy against discrimination and harassment and was willing to
shape the tort concept of outrageousness along the lines of anti-
discrimination law.73 In other words, migration from civil rights to
torts was encouraged in New Mexico and strongly discouraged in
Florida.
The debate over the role of the intentional infliction tort has
also been played out even more explicitly in cases raising
preemption challenges. The essence of a claim of preemption, after
all, is that there can be no overlap between the two domains of law.
Thus, proponents of preemption assert that the intentional infliction
69. Id. at 1009.
70. Id. at 1003 (asserting only claims of negligent supervision and
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
71. Id. at 1009.
72. Pucci v. USAIR, 940 F. Supp. 305, 309 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
73. Coates, 976 P.2d at 1005.
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tort may only fill gaps when it come to civil rights claims, while
opponents of preemption leave more room for overlap and migration
from civil rights. The two general approaches described above
resurface in the preemption cases dealing with harassment claims
in the workplace, although resolution of preemption challenges often
require courts to grapple with issues of statutory interpretation
beyond simply deciding the proper role of the intentional infliction
tort. Those courts denying preemption stress the state's strong
public policy against discrimination and encourage the policy's
reinforcement through tort law, while those upholding preemption
strive to make sure that tort law does not duplicate or encroach
upon other legal domains.
Title VII itself contains an express provision indicating that it
does not preempt state law claims.74 As a result, in workplace torts,
preemption challenges have generally been made on one of two
bases:75 either that the tort claim is preempted by the state civil
rights statute or that the tort claim is barred by the exclusivity
provision of the state workers' compensation statute. The former
theory is consistent with the view that the intentional infliction tort
is only a gap filler and should disappear whenever a state statutory
claim for civil rights violation is available. In fact, it is often
difficult to tell whether this ground for precluding the intentional
infliction claim lies in the gap filling nature of the tort itself or is
based on preemption, i.e., the determination that the state
legislature intended the civil rights remedy to be exclusive. For
example, the Texas Supreme Court recently held that the claim for
intentional infliction could not be brought "[i]f the gravamen of a
plaintiffs complaint is the type of wrong that the statutory [civil
rights] remedy was meant to cover. 7 6 The holding of the Texas
Supreme Court sounds like the claim is preempted by the civil
rights statute and indeed subsequent courts have used the language
of preemption in applying the Texas rule.77 However, a concurring
justice on the Texas Supreme Court insisted that the rule was "not
based on the exclusive or preemptive nature of another remedy but
74. See 28 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2000).
75. In organized workplaces, courts may also have to determine whether a
tort claim is preempted by § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-
Hartley) Act. See, e.g., Retherford v. AT & T Commc'ns of the Mountain States,
Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 971-92 (Utah 1992) (holding tort claim preempted unless it
is purely personal and does not implicate supervisory authority).
76. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 448 (Tex.
2004).
77. Garza v. Univision, No. Civ.A. 3:04CV1905-K, 2005 WL 1107374, at *3
(N.D. Tex. May 6, 2005) (finding intentional infliction claim preempted because
it was based on same facts that support Title VII claim).
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on the nature of the IIED tort itself., 8 The subtle difference here is
that a preemption analysis focuses more on the intent of the
legislature when passing the civil rights act and on the actual
existence of an alternative statutory remedy, whereas in the gap
filling view of the intentional infliction tort, the court disallows the
tort claim because of its view that intentional infliction tort should
be restricted to unusual cases that do not fit comfortably under
other recognized theories of redress.
So far, only a handful of courts have held that the intentional
infliction claim is preempted by state civil rights acts.9 More courts
reject preemption on this ground, ruling that the state civil rights
legislation was designed to increase remedies for victims of
discrimination and is not inconsistent with allowing common law
claims.80
The other quite distinct preemption challenge is based on state
workers' compensation statutes that bar plaintiffs from suing
employers in tort. In these cases, employers argue that tort claims
based on sexual harassment cannot be brought because the
employee's sole remedy is to receive compensation under the
prevailing state workers' compensation scheme. In this genre of
preemption challenges, the contest is not between tort and civil
rights, but rather between tort and workers' compensation. The
discussion of civil rights laws and the policies animating them comes
up only indirectly as the courts grapple with whether victims of
sexual harassment would be ill-served by channeling their claims
into the workers' compensation system, well-known for its
ungenerous awards and designed principally to respond to
industrial accidents and occupational disease. Amidst technical
discussions of whether the sexual harassment "arises out of' and is
"in the course of" employment or falls within one of the enumerated
exceptions to workers' compensation coverage, courts are also called
78. Hoffmann-La Roche, 144 S.W.3d at 451 (Hecht, J., concurring).
79. See Quantock v. Shared Mktg. Servs., Inc., 312 F.3d 899, 905 (7th Cir.
2002) (applying Illinois law); Greenland v. Fairtron Corp., 500 N.W.2d 36, 38
(Iowa 1993). See also Wilson v. Lowe's Home Ctr., 75 S.W.3d 229, 239 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2001) (holding claim against employer preempted, but claim against
individual supervisor not preempted); Arthur v. Pierre Ltd., 100 P.3d 987, 994
(Mont. 2004).
80. See Burns v. Mayer, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1267-68 (D. Nev. 2001);
Funk v. F & K Supply, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 205, 218 (N.D.N.Y. 1999); Cronin v.
Sheldon, 991 P.2d 231, 241 (Ariz. 1999); Rojo v. Kliger, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 140
(Sup. Ct. 1990); Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc., 543 N.E.2d 1212,
1216 (Ohio 1989); Retherford, 844 P.2d at 967. See also Wilson, 75 S.W.3d at
232 (holding a plaintiff may elect whether to proceed under tort or civil rights
against individual harasser).
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upon to decide whether preserving a tort claim for harassment and
discrimination serves an important state interest. On this point, the
workers' compensation preemption decisions have tended to
reiterate the "gap filler" versus "reinforcement of civil rights" debate
discussed above and have produced sharp splits in the jurisdictions.
Some of the strongest statements in favor of allowing civil
rights principles to migrate into tort law have come in the workers'
compensation preemption cases.8' A leading decision from the
Supreme Court of Florida in 1989, for example, took a broad view of
that state's commitment to eradicating sexual harassment,
declaring that the state's workers' compensation scheme did bar tort
actions based on harassment and insisting that "[p]ublic policy now
requires that employers be held accountable in tort for the sexually
harassing environments they permit to exist, whether the tort claim
is premised on a remedial statute or on the common law."8 2 Similar
sentiments about the importance of allowing "cumulative remedies"
for harassment victims to reinforce the "strong public policies"
against sexual harassment have been echoed more recently by the
Supreme Court of Colorado in a same-sex harassment case alleging
intentional infliction and other tort claims against an employer.83
For these states, preservation of a tort remedy serves to vindicate
the "intangible injury to personal rights" caused by harassment
which "robs the person of dignity and self esteem."8
The states that have barred tort claims for harassment in favor
of state workers' compensation coverage do not deny a public policy
against harassment, but instead feel comforted by the fact that
harassment victims can sue under state and federal civil rights
acts.85 These courts see no pressing need for a common law tort
81. See Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 589-91 (Ariz. 1987) (Feldman, J.,
concurring); Horodyskyj v. Karanian, 32 P.3d 470, 479 (Colo. 2001); Byrd v.
Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099, 1103-04 (Fla. 1989); Coates
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 976 P.2d 999, 1006 (N.M. 1999); Kerans v. Porter
Paint Co., 575 N.E.2d 428, 431 (Ohio 1991). See also Busby v. Truswal Sys.
Corp., 551 So. 2d 322, 325 (Ala. 1989) (holding that claim for intentional
infliction was not barred by workers' compensation exclusivity provision);
accord Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C. App. 483, 489, 340 S.E.2d
116, 120 (1986); Anderson v. Save-a-Lot, Ltd., 989 S.W.2d 277, 288-89 (Tenn.
1999); Middlekauffv. Allstate Ins. Co., 439 S.E.2d 394, 396-97 (Va. 1994).
82. Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1104.
83. Horodyskyj, 32 P.3d at 479.
84. Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1104.
85. See Hardebeck v. Warner Jenkinson Co., Inc., 108 F. Supp. 2d 1062,
1064-65 (E.D. Mo. 2000); Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 690 A.2d 936, 940
(Del. 1996); Gordan v. Cummings, 756 A.2d 942, 945 (Me. 2000); Green v.
Wyman-Gordon Co., 664 N.E.2d 808, 813 (Mass. 1996); Fernandez v. Ramsey
County, 495 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Nassa v. Hook-SupeRx,
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claim, even if the workers' compensation remedy is inadequate or ill-
designed to address intangible injuries like harassment." In their
view, as long as harassment is addressed by civil rights statutes, the
state's public policy is vindicated and needs no reinforcement
through the common law.
Only a minority of states bar intentional infliction claims on
either preemption basis. When added to states like Florida,
88
which, while not preempting claims, impose a high bar of proof of
outrageousness, the "gap filler" approach clearly wins out. It would
be inaccurate, however, to report that there is a clear trend. The
law in this area is still quite a mess.
Finally, it should be noted that even if plaintiffs succeed in
asserting a state tort claim for intentional infliction based on
workplace harassment, they still may not be able to keep the case in
a state court in all circumstances. Because employers have the right
to remove the case to federal court on federal question grounds if the
plaintiff also asserts a Title VII claim, 9 to preserve a state forum, a
plaintiff must be willing to give up the federal claim.90 Additionally,
even cases involving only state claims may be removed if there is at
least $75,000 in controversy and complete diversity of citizenship
between the parties. 91 Thus, if a corporate defendant is incorporated
or has its principal place of business in a state other than the state
of the plaintiffs domicile, it has the option to remove to federal
court.92  To defeat complete diversity and prevent removal, a
plaintiff may decide to press intentional infliction claims against
individual supervisors who are more likely to live in the same state
as the plaintiff.
9 3
With respect to the normative question of which approach states
Inc., 790 A.2d 368, 373-74 (R.I. 2002); Jenson v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 468
N.W.2d 1, 10 (Wis. 1991); see also Dickert v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 428 S.E.2d
700, 701-02 (S.C. 1993) (holding that workers' compensation statute bars tort
claims against employer but not against supervisory employee).
86. See cases cited supra note 85.
87. See cases cited supra notes 79 and 85 (listing twelve states).
88. See cases cited supra note 33.
89. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2000).
90. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (holding a
plaintiff can avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state claim);
Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1395 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding a
plaintiff can avoid removal by relying exclusively on state law claim).
91. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2000).
93. See Hawkins v. Bon Appetit Mgmt. Co., No. CV-01-1152-ST, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22192, at *5, *10-19 (D. Or. Oct. 22, 2001) (remanding case to state
court because joinder of individual supervisor was not fraudulent and defeated
complete diversity).
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should adopt, I wish to make three quick points. First, I do not
believe that a choice can be made simply by looking at the respective
domains of torts and civil rights and deciding which is the better
"fit" for harassment claims. Second, I do not believe that
characterizing the intentional infliction tort as a "gap filler" is
enough to decide the migration issue. Finally, I believe that courts
cannot escape deciding the important policy question of whether tort
law should be used to reinforce social norms against discrimination
and harassment, much like it is used to reinforce norms against
violence and fraud.
First, the "domain" issue. The two contrasting positions on the
intentional infliction tort seem to be linked to judgments about the
respective domains of torts and civil rights and the proper location
for a claim of harassment. Whether the court permits an intentional
infliction claim thus may hinge on a question of categorization: is it
by nature a tort claim or a civil rights claim?
The problem with framing the question this way, however, is
that harassment does not fit particularly well under either torts or
civil rights and is, in some respects, an interloper in both domains.
Despite its prevalence, harassment is neither the prototypical tort
nor- the prototypical Title VII claim. Because the concept of "sexual
harassment" was developed through Title VII litigation, it is widely
regarded as a civil rights violation. However, within Title VII law,
harassment is a disfavored cause of action,94 primarily because it
departs from the prototypical form of discrimination: namely,
discrete employment decisions, such as hiring and firing decisions,
which cause direct economic harm. When it comes to tort law,
moreover, intentional infliction harassment claims are also
marginalized, principally because they do not resemble the classic
personal injury. As the recent Restatement of Torts has made clear,
it is claims of physical injury-rather than claims for emotional or
economic loss-that are situated at the core of tort law.
95
This lack of a perfect fit for claims of workplace harassment in
either civil rights or tort law reflects the multi-faceted quality of the
harm; harassment has both a group-based and an individual aspect,
94. See Chamallas, supra note 3, at 355-56 (discussing special
requirements and onerous burdens of proof attached to Title VII sexual
harassment actions).
95. In fact, the latest Restatement project is called "Restatement of the
Law: Torts: Liability for Physical Harm" to underscore its central focus on
physical harms, rather than emotional distress or economic loss. Interestingly,
however, the project includes revisions of key sections relating to emotional
disturbance. For a critique of the new Restatement's structure, see Martha
Chamallas, Removing Emotional Harm from the Core of Tort Law, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 751, 765 (2001).
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and it cannot be pinned down as solely psychological, economic, or
physical in nature. As the quick description of the Pucci case
demonstrates,96 harassment often produces indirect physical harms
and economic consequences, as well as psychological effects.
Additionally, the group-based nature of the harm, similar to that of
hate crimes,97 has been described variously by scholars as a
citizenship harm,98 a harm of subordination,99 or a harm to
identity. 00 Each of these descriptions tries to capture the idea that,
although harassment can only be fully understood in relation to the
status and social meaning attached to the targeted group, ultimately
the harm is visited on individuals and inevitably experienced by
individuals differently. Because harassment, by its nature, is
neither fish nor fowl, a court could logically determine that
harassment does not fit in either civil rights or torts, or it could
decide that it fits into both, depending on its viewpoint. The issue of
assigning a proper domain to the harassment claim is one of policy,
not principle.
Second, a word about "gap fillers." By torts standards, the
intentional infliction tort is a relatively new tort designed originally
by William Prosser and other academics in the late 1940s.10' In this
formative period, the intentional infliction tort was viewed as filling
an important gap or deficiency within tort law to provide a remedy
for serious, nonphysical injury caused by behavior that seemed
unquestionably immoral to judges.0 2 There was a felt need to create
a new tort because the older torts-such as battery, assault, and
slander-did not capture some of the worst forms of intentional
behavior.'0 3 Perhaps even more so than the older, particularized
96. See supra text accompanying notes 33-52.
97. See Lu-in Wang, The Transforming Power of "Hate": Social Cognition
Theory and the Harms of Bias-Related Crime, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 49-50
(1997).
98. See R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and
Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 930 (2004).
99. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN
172-73 (1979).
100. Martha Chamallas, Lucky: The Sequel, 80 IND. L.J. 441, 467-71 (2005)
(discussing harm to identity from trauma of rape).
101. The key foundational articles were Calvert Magruder, Mental and
Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1067 (1936);
William L. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REV. 40, 40 (1956); William
L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L.
REV. 874, 892 (1939) [hereinafter Prosser, Intentional Infliction].
102. See Prosser, Intentional Infliction, supra note 101, at 874, 892.
103. While championing the new claim, Prosser cautioned that the
intentional infliction tort would likely be used only in serious cases of a "real
wrong entitled to redress." Id. at 887.
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intentional torts, the new tort performed a normative function,
singling out morally objectionable conduct that served no socially
useful purpose as the proper subject of tort liability.0 4  As one
leading commentator on the subject has stated, when a court
declares that a recurring type of conduct is "outrageous" it is making
an "official determination of the moral seriousness of that
conduct."10 5 Beyond its moral character, the intentional infliction
tort was also designed to be a flexible claim whose scope could easily
change as cultural understandings of outrageous conduct shifted
and evolved.0 6
Tellingly, when the tort was developed, there was no discussion
of exempting certain behavior because it was already penalized by
some other body of law, such as criminal or regulatory law. Instead,
the "gap filler" description of the intentional infliction tort seems to
have arisen in response to concerns that the malleable modern tort
could theoretically usurp or take over particularized causes of
action, such as libel or battery, which protected interests other than
the interest in emotional tranquility. Calling the intentional
infliction tort a "gap filler" thus only begs the question of whether
there is a gap in tort law that should be filled.
There is little doubt that, if they could not sue for intentional
infliction, many harassment victims would be left without a tort
remedy. Although some forms of sexual harassment include
offensive touchings and are actionable in tort as batteries, many
other cases of harassment involve either no physical contact or
physical contacts that the defendant asserts were not intentionally
offensive or harmful. Similarly, the torts of assault and slander are
too narrow in scope and provide only spotty protection against
harassment. Before recognition of the tort of intentional infliction of
mental distress, the dignitary interests protected by tort law were
highly gendered along traditional lines. The torts of assault and
slander, for example, were best suited to securing older conceptions
of male honor and female chastity, rather than the newer conception
of female autonomy characteristic of contemporary claims of
workplace harassment. 7 Thus, the tort of assault affords recovery
104. Id. at 889.
105. See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the
Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by
Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 53 (1982).
106. Prosser, Intentional Infliction, supra note 101, at 887-89.
107. Indeed, it was the perceived inadequacy of tort law to protect against
sexually harassing behavior that first led Catharine MacKinnon to propose a
civil rights remedy in the early days of the anti-sexual harassment campaign.
See MACKINNON, supra note 99, at 171-73 (1979). Her concerns that tort law
would be unable to appreciate and respond to the inequality dimension of
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only for physically threatening conduct and was originally designed
to reduce the incentive for retaliation and escalation of physical
violence.108 To warrant recovery, the physical harm threatened must
be imminent, and it was sometimes said that words alone do not
constitute an assault.10 9 These limitations have meant that a claim
for assault is generally unavailable in contexts, such as the
workplace, where it is perceived that targets would be unlikely to
fight back and would respond passively by internalizing the pain.
Most notably, "mere" solicitation to have sex was not generally
regarded as actionable, no matter how insulting, offensive, or
threatening to the target.110
Likewise, the tort of slander has so far proved incapable of
responding to the harms of harassment. Traditionally, slander
actions were designed to provide redress for damage to reputation,
including sexual reputation, and often centered on a female
plaintiffs reputation for chastity."' In the nineteenth and early
twentieth century, female plaintiffs often prevailed in defamation
suits when they alleged that defendants made false statements
impugning their reputation for sexual propriety."12 Many courts
even adopted the view that such claims amounted to slander per se
and dispensed with the need to prove special damages."' However,
when the locus of slander suits changed from the private sphere to
the more public sphere of work, women had far less success
convincing courts that the kind of sexual slurs and taunts that
characterize a hostile working environment amounted to actionable
defamation."' According to Professor Lisa Pruitt's extensive history
of defamation cases,"15 contemporary courts are now apt to deny
harassment have been echoed by contemporary feminists. See Ann Scales,
Nooky Nation: On Tort Law and Other Arguments from Nature, in DIRECTIONS
IN SExUAL HARASMENT LAw 307, 315 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B.
Siegel eds., 2004).
108. Johnson v. Sampson, 208 N.W. 814, 815 (Minn. 1926).
109. Id. at 815. See also Prince v. Ridge, 66 N.Y.S. 454 (Sup. Ct. 1900)
(holding that solicitation to have sex not an assault because of "mere words"
doctrine).
110. See Reed v. Maley, 74 S.W. 1079, 1082 (Ky. Ct. App. 1903); Prince, 66
N.Y.S. at 455.
111. Lisa R. Pruitt, Her Own Good Name: Two Centuries of Talk About
Chasity, 63 MD. L. REV. 401, 419-31 (2004).
112. Id. at 431-45.
113. Most U.S. jurisdictions have considered statements that impugn a
woman's chastity to be slander per se. See Lisa Pruitt, "On the Chastity of
Women All Property in the World Depends". Injury from Sexual Slander in the
Nineteenth Century, 78 IND. L.J. 965, 968 (2003).
114. Pruitt, supra note 111, at 458-89.
115. Id.
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recovery and to regard the offending statements as utterly lacking
in content and incapable of being judged as either true or false.
Because claims of harassment cannot be adequately addressed
in tort without resort to the intentional infliction claim, and because
harassment results in serious injury that serves no socially useful
purpose, there is a potential gap for tort law to fill. The real
question becomes whether state courts will determine that
protecting individuals against the harms of discrimination-like the
tort protection afforded against violence and fraud-is of sufficient
importance that it needs to be reinforced through state common law.
Because the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress is now
firmly established in the law, there is no need to resort to civil rights
statutes to imply a new cause of action in tort."16  Instead, the
migration of civil rights law into torts this Essay envisions is an
interpretive process by which courts borrow from civil rights law to
inform and give more concrete meaning to tort standards, such as
the standard of outrageous conduct. The closest analogy may be to
the judicial practice of borrowing safety standards from statutes in
negligence actions to concretize the "reasonable person" standard
under the negligence per se doctrine."7
In the end, each state must decide whether it is time to
"mainstream" and universalize concepts first developed under civil
rights law and to declare that severe and pervasive harassment of
workers can indeed be outrageous. Leaving harassment and
discrimination out of tort law strikes me as a bad idea that
artificially distorts the notion of outrageous conduct and minimizes
the importance of civil rights to individuals. Concerns that relate to
the extent and nature of damages recoverable in such intentional
116. The harassment victim is not asking that the court adopt a common law
remedy for a federal statutory violation, as in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 68-69
(1975), but rather invokes or borrows civil rights concepts as a norm to inform
judicial understandings of outrageous behavior. For a discussion of the
difference between implying a right of action and borrowing statutory norms,
see Michael Traynor, Public Sanctions, Private Liability, and Judicial
Responsibility, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 787, 809-11 (2000).
117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005) (finding negligence per se if the actor violates
a statute without excuse that is designed to protect against "the type of accident
the actor's conduct causes, and . . . the accident victim is within the class of
persons the statute is designed to protect"). The negligence per se doctrine
presents an analogy only, however. It does not apply in the civil
rights/intentional infliction context because it pertains to cases in which a
statute is "silent as to civil liability and that cannot be readily interpreted as
impliedly creating a [cause] of action." Id. at 181 cmt. c. Because both Title VII
and state civil rights actions provide for civil liability, they present additional
questions of possible preemption and concerns for multiple remedies.
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infliction actions need not defeat the claim, but can be addressed
directly by judicial allocation of damages"8 or through tort reform
legislation at the state level.
118. To prevent double recovery, foe example, courts have exercised their
discretion to develop methods for allocating damages to state and federal claims
when both are presented. See Channon v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 629
N.W.2d 835, 850-51 (Iowa 2001). See also Sharkey, supra note 6, at 40-44
(discussing allocating jury awards between federal and state claims and
between compensatory and punitive damages).
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